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Just after the July Crisis resulting from the Bolsheviks'
attempt to seize power, the Provisional Government had to deal
with another very strange and fatal event in Russian history.
The delicate conflict between the Provisional Government
without a real power base and the military power reached its
highest tension in late August, which led to the dismissal of
General Kornilov, the Supreme Commander of the Russian
Armed Force by Kerensky, the Prime Minister, who had
appointed the former to that post less than two months before.
Although historians of 1917 seem to agree that this event was
decisive in hastening the downfall of the Provisional Government
and assuring the success of the Bolsheviks, they have advanced
a multitude of different interpretations in characterizing it. In
general, the Kornilov affair has been interpreted in three
different ways. The first one is, as Kerensky claimed, at the time
and afterward, that Kornilov plotted to overthrow the Provisional
Government and to assume dictatorial powers. The second
interpretation holds that the whole affair resulted from an
unfortunate misunderstanding between the prime minister and
his commander in chief. The third view is that Kerensky trapped
Kornilov by first ordering the General to send a cavalry corps to
Petrograd to help suppress an anticipated Bolshevik uprising,
and then, when Kornilov did as instructed, accusing him of
sending the troops to topple the government. This was Kornilov's
own view of the matter. 1
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Katkov's view about the matter belongs to the third. In this
book, which constitutes a step-by-step recapitulation of the
Kornilov affair beginning with a review of conditions in the
Russian army following the demise of the monarchy and
concluding with a summary of both the personal and political
consequences of the affair, we can notice his almost complete
exoneration of General Kornilov and a thoroughgoing indictment
of Kerensky.
As a well-known historian of the February Revolution of 1917,
Katkov explains how the Kornilov episode was of fundamental
importance in effecting the collapse of Kerensky's government by
perusing the exclusive material available to him along with other
sources. In doing so, he argues that the Kornilov affair was
nothing more than the personal invention of Kerensky.
On what historical sources is this conclusion based? How does
he treat them? How does he develop his interpretation from
these materials? By asking these questions, this paper tries to
review his way of interpreting the Kornilov affair.
II. Method and Evidence
One characteristic of Katkov's method of historical research is
his relative disregard of the secondary sources. According to
him, in most secondary sources, "the authors' historical insights
have to be winnowed from the chaff of traditional historiography
(p.xii]." In pursuing his former works, his method seems to be
subject to detailed analysis of the accounts given in official
documents and by eye-witnesses contemporary with the events
described.
However, this method has unusual difficulties to be entirely
applied to the study of the Kornilov affair, because the reporting
of events treated in this work was seriously biased from the
outset. Katkov is convinced that not only did Kerensky, in his
version of the affair, suppress every element that failed to
reinforce his own views, but those who would have been ready to
lend support to Kornilov either had no opportunity to state their
opinions, or else were afraid to do so (p.xii). To deal with this
bias in the sources, based on the collected materials, he
1 Richard Pipes. The New Republic. Apr. 25 1988. p.39.
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compiled "a synthesized version" of Kornilov's original deposition
which, he believes, is the most reliable and important material
concerning the event (p.xiii). This synthesized Kornilov
deposition as attached in the Appendix gives much strength to
this book.
Katkov seems to have a deep faith in this material. He,
therefore. purposely omits reference to other documents or
articles which, he thinks, are motivated by the desire either to
justify their authors' conduct in retrospect or to vilify their
political opponents (p.202). As a result, the readers are deprived
of the opportunities to consider or evaluate different historical
sources and interpretations of some parts of the event which are
belittled by him. Instead of confusing the readers by introducing
unimportant or biased sources, he tries to convince the readers
that Kerensky's momentous denunciation of the head of the
Russian armed forces was the final blow to the heroic attempts
of the military administration to channel the evolution of
political and social forces into a legal and stable form by drawing
upon the hitherto unknown and neglected sources at his
disposal (p.xiv).
In other words, his book is not a discussion of the historical
viewpoints on the Kornilov affair. Rather, it is a chronological
recapitulation of the events based on his materials. Readers can
hardly find various debates , different opinions, interpretations,
or historical perspectives on these events except the very brief
comments on the Kornilov historiography in his short
bibliographical note.
III. Personality-Oriented Approach
In this book, Katkov strongly stresses the role of personal
relationships and covert political maneuvering in the Kornilov
affair. He tries to explore the responsibilities for the affair among
its rival protagonists. Based on the rigorous analysis of the
related evidences, Katkov produces especially insightful
characterization of the affair's main actors- Kornilov, Kerensky,
and Lvov.
In this personality-oriented approach, Katkov's analysis can be
reduced to an almost complete exoneration of General Kornilov,
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who emerges as the unwitting victim of political forces beyond
his ability to comprehend, and a sharp and vindictive attack on
Kerensky." This conclusion rests essentially on several points of
interpretation.
First, Kornilov's disposition of reliable troops on the
approaches to Petrograd, which began as early as 6-7 August,
was directed solely against the Germans and the Bolsheviks,
was accomplished with the full knowledge of the Provisional
Government, and was therefore in no way part of any military
plot to overthrow the existing regime. Second, the famous
conversation of 24 August between Kornilov and V.N. L'vov,
which effectively precipitated the crisis, was entirely innocent on
the part of the Supreme Commander, who sincerely believed that
L'vov was an authorized agent of the Kerensky government.
Third, the report of his conversation with Kornilov that L'vov
then conveyed to Kerensky was a tissue of obvious lies which
the prime minister deliberately used to invent a
counterrevolutionary plot in order to avoid introducing promised
military reforms that would have caused a break with the
Petrograd Soviet and the probable loss of his position. In sum,
one of the Katkov's main arguments in this book is that the
event was not a counterrevolutionary attempt plotted by General
Kornilov but Kerensky's trap of the General for the purpose of
keeping his power. However, there are some points in this book
which should be examined against this argument.
IV. Treatment of Kerensky's Behavior
In order to validate his argument of Kerensky's concoction of
Kornilov, Katkov patiently analyzes Kerensky's behaviors and
motives in several critical moments. Katkov's treatment of
Kerensky's behavior is an important issue in this book, because
it is a necessary basis of his conclusion that the Kornilov affair
was the personal invention of Kerensky. In many parts of this
book, Katkov tries to describe that Kerensky is hysteric (p.62),
was in terrible quandary (P.86), his dominant trait is a notorious
vanity (p.86). According to Katkov, Kerensky's career is meteoric
2 John Long, Kornilov Redivivus: New Data On The Prelude To Bolshevism,
Russian History, Vol.III, Part I, 1984, p.106.
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and he lacks self-assurance which brought on a periodic fits of
despondency (p.86).
By this psycho-analytic description of Kerensky, Katkov tries
to not only criticize Kerensky's behavior as inappropriate to deal
with the critical situation which would have been settled down
peacefully otherwise but also invalidate the credibility of
Kerensky's own version of the Kornilov affair which were written
after the affair. Katkov's effort seems to be especially successful
in describing Kerensky's character. The reconstruction of
Kerensky's behavior around the second meeting of Lvov and his
fmal decision not to sign the draft proposed by Kornilov (pp.83-
90), which is based on his analysis of Kerensky's character, is
very imaginative and meticulous.
However, his psycho-analytic description of Kerensky's
behavior can hardly explain other important points in the
Kornilov affair. Why did not Kerensky sign the draft which he
had promised to do? Kerensky's personal interests or his
character do not explain this question satisfactorily. In order to
answer this question in a broad perspective, we need to look at
the relationship between Kerensky and supportive social or
political force to him.
According to Katkov, Kerensky did not sign the Kornilov draft,
because Kerensky realized that to sign the draft would entail a
break with 'Revolutionary Democracy' on the support of which
he had hither to relied (p.86). This argument need to be
developed more specifically. Readers need more detailed
explanations about so-called Revolutionary Democracy,
Kerensky's tie with the Petrograd Soviets, his relation With
Bolsheviks, and the possible influence of these on Kerensky's
decision.
Instead of extending his consideration into Kerensky's relation
with other social or political forces, Katkov rather tries to focus
on the freemasonry movement of Kerensky and other cabinet
members. For example, in explaining Kerensky's behavior of not
informing government of what was going on between him and
Kornilov, Katkov puts much importance on the fact that only
three minister (Nekrasov, Tereshchenko, and Kerensky) were
chosen to meet Kornilov and the meeting kept secret (p.57).
According to Katkov, the bound uniting these three ministerial
members was not their political but their masonic allegiance.
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These three members believed that they had their finger on the
nation's pulse and mirrored the people's aspirations, and would
thus have regarded it as their bounden duty either to press their
decisions on their government or even to force them through
behind the government back (pp.58-59).
References to the nefarious part played in the 1917 events by
the Russian freemasonry is one of Katkov's particular
interpretive Idtosyncrastes." However, the bond between the
three men who formed the secret inner cabinet and weight of
their combined decision seems to be not crucial enough to shade
other points to be considered in discussing the Kornilov affair.
Although it is said that Kerensky became so isolated from the
real Russia and that he was impervious to social analysts', we
need to consider Kerensky's behavior not only in the perspective
of his state of mind, his character, or his masonic relation with
other ministerial members but also in the perspective of his
political quest for maintaining his power in a polarized political
situation of Russia. How could Kerensky regain his popularity in
a political disparity between liberals, conservative side drifted to
the right in search of a strong government and increasingly
popularized leftist Bolshevik power? Did he has a chance of
winning support from liberals and conservatives who had come
to view him as an incompetent demagogue? How did Kerensky
respond Bolsheviks' challenge? By asking these questions, we
may take better perspective of understanding Kerensky's final
decision of claiming him as a defender of the Revolution and
crushing so-called right wing counterrevolution.
v. Involvement of the Kadet Party
The involvement of the Kadet party is another important issue
in the study of the Kornilov affair, because the analysis of the
involved group may show an element of class dynamics in the
Kornilov affair. In other words, the involvement of the Kadet
party may raise the problem of interpreting the Kornilov episode
in the perspective of social class struggle.
3 John Long, ibid., p.106.
4 Richard Abraham. Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution. New
York: Columbia University Press. 1987, p.275.
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This is a very controversial issue about which the major
concerned figures such as Milyukov and Maklakov published
different versions of the story. While elaborating his view of the
affair that Kornilov was an unwitting victim of circumstance in
his book, The Russian Revolution, Milyukov seems to deny his
involvement in the affair by keeping silence about the matter.5
But his view of the affair and his silence about possible contacts
with the Kornilov attempt are severely criticized by the
translator of his book.
In his introduction to the translation of Milyukov's book,
Hamburg says that the view of Kornilov as unwitting victim of
circumstance is inconsistent with the evidence. According to
him, Kornilov was a conscious participant in a determined effort
by non-socialist politicians to strip the Petrograd Soviet of
political power, and, if necessary, to establish a military
dictatorship. Milyukov and other Kadets were, to their
subsequent embarrassment, deeply implicated in this effort. He
continues that, in fact, Milyukov's virtual silence about his own
contacts with the Kornilov movement best can be explained as
an attempt to conceal the fundamental errors of the Kadet party
in August 1917. 6 In addition, the letter from Maklakov to
Milyukov which is introduced in Katkov's book (pp.142-143)
directly supports the fact of counterrevolutionary contacts
between certain "public men" (including Milyukov) and
representatives of Kornilov.
On the contrary, Rosenburg argues that few leading members
of the Kadet Party, if any, took a personal role in actively
planning or executing the conspiracy, and that offlcial Kadet
organizations, such as the Central Committee or the Petrograd
or Moscow city groups, stood entirely aloof. According to
Rosenburg, conspiracy was the work of the Republican Center,
in conjunction with army groups like the Union of Officers and
individual members of the General Staff. Even in terms of
support for such a venture, much less their participation,
Milyukov, Kokoshkin, and most of the party's verkhovniki were
ambiguous at best, refusing to encourage a unilateral move on
Kornilov's part while supporting his goals in the government. 7
5 Paul Mtlyukov, The Russian Revolution 2. translated by G.M. Hamburg.
Academic International Press. 1984.
6 Paul Mtlyukov, ibid .. p.xii.
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As aforementioned, the point of this controversy is whether the
Kadets, who represent the political interests of the liberal middle
class of contemporary Russian society, were involved or not. If
the Kadets were involved, the Kornilov affair can be interpreted
as a counterrevolutionary attempt of a combined force of the
military and the moderate middle class. If not, the Kornilov
affair has yet to be analyzed whether it was a conspiracy at all or
whether it was supported by other groups than the Kadet Party.
These are the questions which should not be avoided in dealing
with the problems of the Kadets' involvement.
In this respect, Katkov's treatment of these questions in this
book is disappointing. In criticizing Kerensky's view that the
Kadet Party supported the Kornilov conspiracy, Katkov admits
that the Kadets must have expressed general sympathy with the
immediate aims of Kornilov, which were to halt the
disintegration in the fabric of the state and of the armed forces
(p.141). However, without any clear conclusion about the
possibility of the Kadet involvement, he hastily ends the chapter
dealing with this issue (Chapter Eleven, Later Reconstructions,
Legends, and Rumors) just by quoting the Maklakov's letter to
Milyukov, which explains about what happened at the
Conference of Public Men at Kishkin's house (pp.142-143).
Katkov says that there were contacts between certain group of
the Kadet Party and representatives of the military by drawing
upon Maklakov's letter, which he regards as authentic, in the
latter part of the book (p.200). But, he does not develop his
argument about the influence of these contacts on the overall
development of the Kornilov affair any more. He does not explain
how to include the nature of these contacts in interpreting the
Kornilov affair in his perspective of the personality-oriented
approach. Katkov proudly states that he has been given access
to this private letter which has never been published. However,
what the readers may expect from his book is not just the
author's access to a wide range of related historical materials
but also his evaluation about the materials and his clear opinion
about the event which can be explored through these materials.
The aforementioned questions are not really answered in his
book.
7 W. Rosenberg. Liberals in the Russian Revolution. Princeton Univ. Press. 1974.
pp.226-227.
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VI. Intervention of Vvov
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Another example showing Katkov's relative negligence in
refuting the existence of conspiracy against the Provisional
Government can be found in Chapter Six, which deals with the
intervention of L'vov. L'vov published an article in the Paris
Russian language newspaper Posledniya novosti between 30
November and 9 December 1920, in which L'vov states that
before his first interview with Kerensky he had met in Moscow
two somewhat obscure characters: Dr. Dobrinsky, the former
member of the first Duma, and Aladyn, who had recently
returned to Russia carrying letters of introduction from personal
friends in the British army.
In L'vov's article, it was Dobrinsky and Aladyn who implanted
in L'vov the notion that Kornilov meant to proclaim himself
dictator. L'vov also states that he went to see Kerensky at the
instigation of Dobrinsky who knew all about the coup being
plotted at GHQ. In short, L'vov clearly states in the article that
there was a coup attempt at GHQ and that for his role as a
mediator between Kerensky and GHQ, he met two
representatives from GHQ. To be sure, L'vov's argument
contradicts Katkov's conviction that there was not a conspiracy
against the Provisional Government.
Katkov severely criticizes the credibility of L'vov's report.
According to him, L'vov's life in these years had been a
checkered one. He had emigrated, and had become a clochard de
Paris: sleeping under bridges and eating whatever he could
scrounge from old acquaintances. In this desperate situation,
L'vov "decided to make some money by publishing sensational
revelations about the background to the Kornilov affalr" (p.76).
However, Katkov is not clear in criticizing the contents of
L'vov's descriptions about Dobrinsky and Aladyn. Katkov says
that Dobrinsky and Aladyn are obscure characters. But, the
readers may be confused about what Katkov exactly means by
using the word 'obscure'. Rather, Katkov's explanation about
these two figures are obscure. It may mean that their role in the
event is difficult to articulate. Or it can mean that L'vov's
insisting on the existence of contact between himself and the
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representatives of 'certain elements' who knew well about the
coup being plotted at GHQ is doubtful.
Without further mentioning these two figures, Katkov just
admits the existence of the contact between L'vov and these two
figures in the latter part of this chapter (p.77). Instead, he
should have provided his explanation in more detail about their
role and involvement in the coup attempt at GHQ. Or he should
have discussed more about L'vov's descriptions of these two
figures and the credibility of his descriptions. By doing so, he
should have tried to justify his main argument that there was
not a preliminary coup attempt at GHQ. Unfortunately, little
effort is made for justification of his argument.
VII. Issue of Conspiracy
It is not easy to tell whether there was or was not a
conspiracy. As Katkov points out, the expression "conspiracy
against state" varies according to the historical and political
circumstances in which it is used. Nevertheless, Katkov himself
says in Chapter Twelve (Looking Back At The Evidence), "the
facts, and pseudo-facts, reported in the foregoing chapters
should help us determine the critical question of whether there
was or was not a plot to overthrow the Provisional Government
by force of arms (p.l45)." Here, we should consider why it is
important to say that there was or was not a conspiracy.
To be sure, this question is important for Katkov, because the
negation of the existence of a conspiracy from the Kornilov side
is the very basis of his main argument that the Kornilov affair
was only a personal invention of Kerensky. From a different
historical perspective, the existence of a conspiracy is important
because this is a necessary premise to say that the Kornilov
affair was a form of social struggle. Historians of the latter
perspective try to characterize the Kornilov affair as a social
class dynamic by identifying one class which was involved in the
conspiracy and the other class which tried to smash this
attempt. For example, Lenin, whose view of the events once
predominated the Soviet historiography on the affair, defined the
Kornilov affair as a counterrevolutionary movement of
reactionary generals and capitalists supported overtly by the
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bourgeois Kadets and de facto by Kerensky, the Allies, and the
compromising Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionary parties.
Lenin argued that the unity of this vast conspiracy had been
shattered only by internal intrigue and the subsequent prompt
action of the Bolshevik-led popular masses."
The social class dynamics approach of the Kornilov affair has
been continued in the new and more sophisticated account of
many other Soviet and Western historians. By and large, this
approach has concentrated its focus on the discussion of the
nature of the involved class and the aspect of ciass struggle in
the event as a plotted counterrevolutionary attempt.
In sum, in one perspective based on the personal relationship
around the event, the Kornilov affair can be interpreted as the
result of Kerensky's concoction for the purpose of keeping his
power. In other perspective, the Kornilov affair is one aspect of
the social struggle which appeared as a counterrevolutionary
attempt that finally catalyzed the Bolsheviks' seizure of power.
We can hardly decide which of these two perspectives is
correct in interpreting the Kornilov affair. Maybe, the Kornilov
affair is too complicated an historical event to be interpreted by
either one or the other. However, Katkov clearly shows some
points in this book that should be studied beyond the analysis
of the personal relationship and their characters. In this sense,
his ambivalent statement that "a plan to overthrow the
government certainly did exist, but the Supreme Commander
had not decided to execute it (pp.152-153)" is an obscure
conclusion about the question of whether there was or was not a
conspiracy. In fact, this statement can be interpreted either as
an admission of the existence of conspiracy or as a negation
according to the various usage of the expression 'conspiracy' as
he points out. Katkov may also recognizes the importance of the
social struggle in the event. But, as mentioned earlier, he does
not sufficiently explore the related problems of a conspiracy,
maybe because the existence of a conspiracy is the basic
assumption for the interpretation of the events as a social
struggle, which contradicts his view that the Kornilov affair was
nothing more than the personal invention of Kerensky. By
almost intentionally disregarding these problems, Katkov
actually ignores the important issues initiated by the social class
8 Recited from John Long's article p.103.
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interpretation of the affair.
VIII. Conclusion
As with many other historical events, the Kornilov affair can
better be understood in its relation with the future development
of Russian history. Katkov well recognizes this. He is convinced
that the Kornilov episode was very important in effecting the
collapse of the Provisional Government, as the whole tragic
imbroglio to the Bolsheviks' seizure of power.
In this book, Katkov severely indicts Kerensky for the failure of
the heroic attempts of the military administration to channel the
evolution of political and social forces into a legal and stable
form (p.xtv). But, his blame of Kerensky seems to be
exaggerated. Moreover, his criticism of Kerensky is excessively
grounded on his psycho analysis which is not enough to be used
to evaluate the entire role of Kerensky and his behavior in the
affair. The political and social situation of Russia at that time
was so complicated and chaotic that the heroic attempt of the
military administration could hardly calm the whirlwinds of
political and social conflicts down into a legal and stable
evolution. The situation was beyond being smoothly handled or
dramatically changed by a single character, Kerensky.
This is not to say that the role of Kerensky in the Provisional
Government and his influence in the Kornilov episode and other
events at that time can be safely disregarded. The point is that
the Kornilov affair, in the context of its effects on coming of the
Bolshevism, was more than a result of extremely complicated
personal relations among the people concerned. At least. the
Kornilov affair needs to be analyzed further about the social,
political, and historical background which resulted in or
influenced these complicated personal relations. His indictment
of Kerensky or his emotional advocacy of the heroic attempt of
General Kornilov is excessively strong that it overwhelms the
need of developing his views and explanations about the social
and political backgrounds of the Kornilov affair. This is well
revealed in his almost intentional disregard of the related
problems of a conspiracy, which may raise the most significant
shortcoming of this book.
